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ABSTRACT 
It is now possible for anyone with rudimentary computer skills 
to create a pornographic deepfake portraying an individual 
engaging in a sex act that never actually occurred. These realistic 
videos, called “deepfakes,” use artificial intelligence software to 
impose a person’s face onto another person’s body. While 
pornographic deepfakes were first created to produce videos of 
celebrities, they are now being generated to feature other 
nonconsenting individuals—like a friend or a classmate. This 
Article argues that several tort doctrines and recent non-
consensual pornography laws are unable to handle published 
deepfakes of non-celebrities. Instead, a federal criminal statute 
prohibiting these publications is necessary to deter this activity.  
INTRODUCTION 
There is a video of you having sex on the internet. You do not 
remember being with this person because it never happened. Others are 
watching the video online, too. 
The video is unfamiliar because it is a “deepfake”—an 
“ultrarealistic fake video” where your face is superimposed onto another 
person’s body though the use of artificial intelligence software.1 And 
someone has published it online for the world to see. This is not science 
fiction. 
 In 2015, Google released TensorFlow, its “internal tool for 
developing artificial intelligence algorithms,” to the public.2 Google CEO, 
Sundar Pichai, believes that artificial intelligence will change humanity 
                                                 
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May, 2019; B.A. in Philosophy, 
B.A. in Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, June, 2015.  
1 Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/technology/fake-videos-deepfakes.html. 
2 Dave Gershgorn, Google Gave the World Powerful AI Tools, and the World 
Made Porn with Them, QUARTZ (Feb. 7, 2018), https://qz.com/1199850/google-
gave-the-world-powerful-open-source-ai-tools-and-the-world-made-porn-with-
them/. 
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more profoundly than fire.3 While Pichai recognizes fire’s benefits, he also 
acknowledges that “it kills people” and that “we have to overcome its 
downsides, too.”4 Similarly, although Google machine learning tools can 
be used in beneficial ways, like discovering new planets,5 they can also be 
used for deviant purposes. This was illustrated when the anonymous 
Redditor6 under the moniker “deepfakes” used TensorFlow to transpose 
Gal Gadot’s face, along with the faces of other celebrities, onto porn stars’ 
bodies in porn videos.7 Photos of these celebrity faces were compiled from 
Google image searches, stock photos, and YouTube videos.8 This 
transposition is completed through a process of “deep learning.” “[D]eep 
learning consists of networks of interconnected nodes that autonomously 
run computations on input data” and deepfakes trains this algorithm on 
both the celebrity’s faces and the porn videos.9 “[T]he nodes arrange 
themselves to complete a particular task, like convincingly manipulating 
video on the fly”10 so the celebrity’s face and its various angles and 
positions follow the body in the video. 
 A Hollywood production budget is not necessary to create 
deepfakes from home.11 All one needs is a computer, a decent graphics 
card,12 the FakeApp program (which uses the open-source software 
Google released),13 hundreds of pictures of the desired person (known as 
                                                 
3 Theodore Schleifer, Google CEO Sundar Pichai Says AI Is More Profound Than 
Electricity and Fire, RECODE (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.recode.net 
/2018/1/19/16911180/sundar-pichai-google-fire-electricity-ai. 
4 Id. 
5 NASA’s Kepler Telescope Discovered a New Exoplanet with Google’s Help, 
NBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/video/nasa-s-
kepler-telescope-discovered-a-new-exoplanet-with-google-s-help-
1121785923978?v=raila&. 
6 Redditors are users of the website Reddit. Redditor, ENGLISH BY OXFORD 
DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/redditor (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2018). Reddit acts as a message board where users can post internet links, 
share content, and interact with each other. See Homepage, REDDIT, 
https://www.redditinc.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
7 See Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked, 
MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 11, 2017), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 See Roose, supra note 1 (“Until recently, realistic computer-generated video 
was a laborious pursuit available only to big-budget Hollywood productions or 
cutting-edge researchers.”).  
12 Cole, supra note 7. 
13 Roose, supra note 1. 
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a “faceset”), and a few hours of time.14 A tutorial is easily accessible 
online.15 While the deepfake movement began with adding celebrity faces 
to porn stars, it quickly evolved into using images of friends and 
classmates. The now-banned Deepfakes subreddit16 and a now-closed 
Discord chatroom17 were hotbeds for users to exchange tips on producing 
deepfake porn videos of each other’s crushes and ex-significant others.18 
Other open-source tools like the DownAlbum19 and Instagram Scraper20 
easily allow individuals to download all images on a person’s social media 
account to create a faceset.21 Still, to make a seamless deepfake, the 
producer needs to find a body that matches the unwary victim’s face. 
Finding the ideal body has also become quasi-automated. Browser-based 
applications employing facial recognition software enable users to upload 
a photo of the person they want in the fake video, and the website outputs 
the most comparable adult performer.22  
 Some websites have taken marginal steps to ensure that deepfakes 
are not being created with the photos of non-consenting individuals. 
Reddit has banned the deepfakes subreddit that had a hundred thousand 
members.23 Discord has shut down two servers where the chats centered 
                                                 
14 See Tutorial for Mac : Deepfakes — Reddit [MIRROR], MEDIUM (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@oliverlardner/tutorial-for-mac-deepfakes-reddit-mirror-
d75eb8069a16 (instructing an interested user to let the downloaded computer 
processes run for a few hours). 
15 Id. 
16 Subreddits are individual message boards within the Reddit website that focus 
on a specific topic. See Subreddit, ENGLISH BY OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/subreddit (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
17 Discord is a text and video chatroom website for the video gaming community. 
See generally About, DISCORD, https://discordapp.com/company (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2018). 
18 See Samantha Cole, People Are Using AI to Create Fake Porn of Their Friends 
and Classmates, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 26, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/ev5eba/ai-fake-porn-of-friends-deepfakes. 
19 DownAlbum is a Google Chrome extension and can be accessed on the Chrome 
Web Store. DownAlbum, CHROME WEB STORE, https://chrome.google.com/ 
webstore/detail/downalbum/cgjnhhjpfcdhbhlcmmjppicjmgfkppok?hl=en (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
20 Instagram Scraper is an application that can scrape and download an Instagram 
user’s photos and videos. Instagram-scraper 1.5.40, PYTHON SOFTWARE 
FOUNDATION, https://pypi.org/project/instagram-scraper/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2018). 
21 Cole, supra note 18. 
22 Id.  
23 Roose, supra note 1. 
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on deepfakes, and has banned several users.24 Pornhub and Twitter have 
also banned deepfake videos.25 However, the websites hosting these 
videos are shielded by a 1996 statute, the Communications Decency Act,26 
which immunizes them from being legally responsible for user-generated 
content.27 The webpages are not incentivized to take swift action to fight 
these uploads, and many videos are still online.28 
 Deepfakes are not only going to be used for self-gratification, but 
also have the potential to be used to extort, humiliate, harass, and 
blackmail victims. The creation of deepfakes is in its early stage, but this 
type of production carries immense potential to be indistinguishable from 
real-life videos. In our present age of misinformation, society will soon 
have to deal with deepfakes that can threaten national security. Consider a 
deepfake of President Trump announcing impending nuclear missile 
attack on North Korea. 
 Unfortunately, as with many new technologies, the law is 
unequipped to handle these impending issues. Courts must answer 
questions like: should state tort doctrines or involuntary porn statutes be 
interpreted to encompass fictitious fabricated videos? Does Congress need 
to pass a law to handle these types of cases? Or, does the First Amendment 
completely immunize the publication and creation of deepfakes as a form 
of protected speech?  
This Article will focus on the legality of pornographic deepfakes 
featuring a non-celebrity, such as an acquaintance, and their circulation on 
                                                 
24 Samantha Cole, Targets of Fake Porn Are at the Mercy of Big Platforms, 
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 5, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
59kzx3/targets-of-fake-porn-deepfakes-are-at-the-mercy-of-big-platforms. 
25 Angela Moscaritolo, Pornhub, Twitter Ban ‘Deepfake’ AI-Modified Porn, PC 
MAG (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.pcmag.com/news/359067/pornhub-twitter-ban-
deepfake-ai-modified-porn. 
26 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
27 See id. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— (A) any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, 
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).”  
28 Damon Beres, Pornhub Continued to Host ‘Deepfake’ Porn with Millions of 
Views, Despite Promise to Ban, MASHABLE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://mashable.com 
/2018/02/12/pornhub-deepfakes-ban-not-working/#cO19rvp..PqM. 
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websites and amongst friends.29 It will show that sufficient legal 
mechanisms are not in place to effectively prevent such deepfakes.30 In 
this Article, these videos will be referred to as “personal deepfakes.”  
Part I briefly explores First Amendment jurisprudence and argues 
that the free speech clause does not protect false and obscene deepfakes. 
Part II argues that most victims of published personal deepfakes are 
currently left without sufficient legal remedies in the civil context: (1) the 
producers of personal deepfakes are likely making fair use of the collated 
copyrighted photos used in the videos because deepfakes are largely 
transformative and often not for commercial profit; (2) only victims that 
can show the producer aimed to cause severe emotional distress can 
succeed on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; (3) 
virtually no victim can bring a negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claim since the victim was never in actual harm’s way; and (4) false light 
invasion of privacy causes of action are most apt to handle these type of 
videos, but the public at large must be aware of the deepfake—which is 
unlikely. Part III examines how recent criminal statutes—“revenge porn” 
laws—also fail to prohibit this conduct because producers likely do not 
intend to harm the featured person. However, a substantial number of the 
statutes have the potential to apply to personal deepfakes because they 
include the word “depict,” which allows for an interpretation that 
encompasses realistic portrayals of individuals. This Article then discusses 
the need for a federal criminal statute prohibiting any online publication 
of a deepfake and describes which elements should be included. Part IV 
argues that solely creating the personal deepfakes in the confines of one’s 
home should remain legally protected because mere production does not 
carry the same harms as publishing the videos.  
 
                                                 
29 A legal analysis focused on celebrities being used in deepfakes would be 
substantially different. Celebrities have developed and earned a reputation 
associated with their likeness. Deepfakes featuring celebrities also have the 
potential to be used for a more commercial purpose, opening the door for a tort-
like misappropriation of likeness claim. See generally Kathryn Riley, 
Misappropriation of Name or Likeness Versus Invasion of Right of Publicity, 12 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 587 (2001). 
30 Some authors think sufficient legal mechanisms are already in place. See 
generally David Greene, We Don’t Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already 
Have Them, ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2018/02/we-dont-need-new-laws-faked-videos-we-already-have-them; 
Cory Doctorow, Deepfakes That Hurt People are Already Illegal, So Let’s Stop 
Trying to Rush Out Ill-Considered Legislation, BOINGBOING (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://boingboing.net/2018/02/13/there-ive-done-something.html. 
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FALSE SPEECH & OBSCENITY 
Deepfakes, at their core, are false and crude videos. The legality 
of publishing these videos thus implicates the First Amendment in two 
contexts: false speech and obscenity. In regard to false speech, the free 
marketplace of ideas, not the judicial system, is intended to correct 
pernicious opinions.31 Yet, lies do not advance the robust debate on public 
issues and do not carry any constitutional value.”32 Obscene speech is also 
not afforded First Amendment protection.33 So, the judicial system can 
correct some pernicious speech—possibly deepfakes. 
 Courts are still hesitant when dealing with false speech to avoid 
chilling otherwise protected or worthy speech.34 There is a heavy 
presumption against the constitutional validity of any system of prior 
restraint of expression.35 Although not considering an injunction in New 
York Times v. Sullivan,36 the Supreme Court held that recovering damages 
for defamation of a public official required showing that the false 
statement was made with malice.37 Malice was defined as “knowledge that 
it was false or [made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”38 The Court laid out an even broader rule when dealing with 
defamation of private individuals. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,39 the Court 
held that states can define their own standard of liability for a publisher of 
“defamatory falsehood[s] injurious to a private individual” so long as it is 
not strict liability.40 A standard of negligence or higher is required.  
 Therefore, in order for a defamation claim to be actionable, there 
needs to be a form of distribution that brings speech into the public realm 
where it can unjustly disrupt the free marketplace of ideas. Published 
deepfakes—to the extent that they are a form of false speech—are not 
constitutionally protected when used to intentionally defame a public or 
private individual. Deepfakes can similarly be vulnerable to legal 
                                                 
31 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339−40 (1974) (“However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
32 Id. 
33 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
34 Julia K. Wood, Truth, Lies, and Stolen Valor: A Case for Protecting False 
Statements of Fact Under the First Amendment, 61 DUKE L.J. 469, 481–82 (2011). 
35 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
36 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
37 Id. at 279−80. 
38 Id. at 280. 
39 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
40 Id. at 347−48. 
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restrictions when viewed under the lens of another form of constitutionally 
unprotected speech: obscenity. 
 Under the First Amendment, obscenity is not protected speech.41 
Still, the Court has expressed skepticism about eroding the First 
Amendment, stating: 
The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be 
left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest 
crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important 
interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity 
safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material 
which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.42 
The test for judging whether this door is opened for federal and 
state intrusion has become the Miller standard. While First Amendment 
limitations “must always remain sensitive to any infringement on 
genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression,”43 
material deemed obscene remains unprotected.44 When analyzing a state 
law, the Miller test asks: 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest[]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.45 
The publication of all pornographic personal deepfakes cannot be deemed 
obscene under the Miller test. If the deepfake does not violate community 
standards (e.g., a non-graphic pornographic deepfake) or has some artistic 
value (e.g., a deepfake featuring a unique blend of colors) then a state or 
federal law prohibiting deepfakes would be unconstitutional. It is 
important that the Court’s seminal obscenity cases centered around some 
type of dissemination of obscene materials.46 Mere personal speech has 
                                                 
41 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
42 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957). 
43 Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 24. 
46 For example, in A Book Named “John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966), the Court explored 
whether a published book was obscene. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957) and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court dealt with the 
mailing of obscene material.  
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not been construed as obscene; obscenity is attached to “materials.”47 The 
legality of banning the creation and viewing of personal deepfakes in the 
privacy of one’s home (thus not actually distributing the deepfake) is 
discussed in Part IV.48  
  Nonetheless, the pure falsity or fakery of personal deepfakes 
raises the question of whether obscenity lies in the reality of the thing 
deemed obscene or in the depiction of what registers as real. The Court 
has reasoned through a similar issue, the visual depiction of minors 
engaging in sex. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,49 the Court analyzed 
a federal statute prohibiting “‘any visual depiction, including any 
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated 
image or picture’ that ‘is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.’”50 Under the Miller standard,51 the Court acknowledged 
that pedophiles could use these virtual videos to help encourage children 
to engage in sexual activity52 but that not all teenage sexual activity 
“appeal[s] to the prurient interest.”53 It further acknowledged that “teenage 
sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children . . . have inspired countless 
literary works” along with Academy Award winning films like American 
Beauty.54 Therefore, the overbroad provision violated the First 
Amendment.55 The Court’s treatment of fake or virtual videos appears to 
be grounded in real harm, but the Court has not disclosed the possibility 
that a more narrow prohibition on virtual pornography can be 
constitutional.56 Obscenity thus seems to exist in the depiction of what 
registers as real, with an special importance to it causing actual harm. 
Personal deepfakes, although fictitious, can still cause actual harm to the 
real person that is being depicted: the individual’s well-being, reputation, 
and sense of security. Since no court has ruled on the constitutionality of 
                                                 
47 Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (“This much has been categorically settled by the Court, 
that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”) (citing Kois v. 
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 
(1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). 
48 See infra Part IV. 
49 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
50 Id. at 241. 
51 Id. at 240. 
52 Id. at 241. 
53 Id. at 246. 
54 Id. at 247−48. 
55 Id. at 258. 
56 See id. at 259–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court does leave open the 
possibility that a more complete affirmative defense could save a statute's 
constitutionality . . . implicitly accepting that some regulation of virtual child 
pornography might be constitutional.”).  
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banning personal deepfakes, we now turn to the current legal recourse for 
victims. 
II. CURRENT PRIVATE LEGAL RECOURSES FOR PUBLISHED 
DEEPFAKES 
 This section focuses on the legal ramifications of when an 
individual (“Producer”) collects images of a person (“Victim”), uses them 
in creating a personal deepfake, and then publishes the product online by 
uploading it to a website. The Producer would likely use a social media 
site, like Facebook, to collect and collate photographs of the Victim to 
create the deepfake faceset, taking advantage of potentially hundreds of 
photos of the Victim at various angles. Victims might consider various 
forms of recourse which will be analyzed below. None of these remedies, 
however, are sufficient to handle personal deepfakes’ harms to the Victim.   
A. Copyright Infringement & Fair Use 
A Victim’s potential copyright infringement claims are likely to 
fail despite retaining copyright protection in all of her photographs 
uploaded online57 because the Producer is making fair use of the images. 
Downloading a Facebook photo is essentially making a copy and is a 
violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106, because the Victim is a copyright owner and 
has a bundle of “exclusive rights.”58 The Victim has the exclusive right to 
reproduce, copy, display, perform publicly, and prepare derivative works 
based on the copyrighted work—in this case, the uploaded photos.59 Any 
violation of one of these rights may result in a copyright infringement 
cause of action. 
Parodies are afforded protection through the fair use doctrine, but 
a justification of labeling personal deepfakes as a parody in order to avoid 
civil liability will likely fail. The owner’s exclusive rights of her 
copyrighted work are limited when an individual makes “fair use” of the 
work, allowing that person to reproduce the image. Fair use is permitted 
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . 
                                                 
57 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device. Works of authorship include . . . pictorial . . . works.”). But 
bear in mind that Facebook, too, is granted “a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-
licensable, royalty-free, and worldwide license” to use any IP content that Victim 
posts on or in connection with Facebook (IP License). Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Apr. 19, 2018). 
58 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
59 See id. 
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scholarship, or research.”60 To determine whether the use of a work is a 
fair use, the statute lays out four factors: 
1. the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
2. the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.61 
These factors are not to be treated in isolation, but instead are to be 
explored together, “in light of the purposes of copyright[]:”62promoting 
the arts and science.63 The Supreme Court has focused on the purpose and 
character of the use as protecting parodies since its analysis is guided by 
whether the new work is “transformative” or “adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character.”64  
  Parodies are transformative by humorously criticizing the former 
work and providing some social benefit.65 A subjective perception of 
parodic character by the Producer of the new work is not enough. Instead, 
the parodic character must be reasonably perceived; whether the parody is 
done in good or bad taste is inconsequential for purposes of fair use.66 A 
vulgar parody was the subject of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.67 
when the Court held that the 2 Live Crew song satirizing the Roy Orbison 
song “Pretty Woman” could reasonably be perceived as commenting on 
“the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment 
that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it 
signifies.”68 In a footnote, the Court further moderated its holding by 
stating that parodies that more loosely target an original work than the 2 
                                                 
6017 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
61 Id.  
62 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
63 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]”). 
64 Id. at 579. 
65 See id. at 580. 
66 Id. at 582. 
67 Id. at 569. 
68 Id. at 583. 
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Live Crew song may still be a parody.69 In addition to songs, parodic 
pornographies have been protected by the fair use affirmative defense. The 
Ninth Circuit held that the animated pornography “Starballz” made fair 
use of “Star Wars” as it both broadly mimicked and ridiculed the 
original.70 
 Personal deepfakes likely are not protected by parody law because 
parodies presuppose an underlying work that the new work is commenting 
on in some way. While the Producer is substantially transforming the 
photos of the Victim into a completely new video, there is no commentary 
on a past work and thus no possible objective perception as parody. There 
is even less space for the potential to be a parody in most personal 
deepfakes since they aspire to blur the line between fantasy and reality. 
The Producer and subsequent viewers likely create and watch personal 
deepfakes for the sole purpose of deriving pleasure through the suspension 
of disbelief—they want to believe that they are actually perceiving Gal 
Gadot in a sexual act. In the case of an unsuspecting friend, the Producer 
wants to believe that the visual depiction is actually the Victim.71  
 While not a parody, publishing personal deepfakes makes fair use 
of another’s copyrighted images because it is transformative. Courts place 
a strong emphasis on whether the new work is transformative, such that it 
must “‘supersede[] the objects’” of the original copyrighted work.72 
Transforming the work into something new with a different purpose or 
character likely satisfies the goal of promoting the arts and sciences.73 
“The more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
of other factors, like commerciality, that may weigh against a finding of 
fair use.”74 Commercial use of copyrighted material presumptively creates 
an unfair exploitation of the copyright owner’s monopoly privilege.75 This 
                                                 
69 Id. at 580 n.14. 
70 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (“A preliminary analysis of the fair use factors indicates that Lucasfilm 
is not likely to succeed in its copyright claim because the parodic nature of 
Starballz may constitute fair use.”). 
71 Deepfakes outside the context of pornography can exist with parodic character. 
For example, a deepfake featuring professional basketball players’ faces on Game 
of Thrones characters can be a parody about how the playoff race is likened to the 
war over who will rule the Iron Throne. 




75 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) 
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 
(1984)). 
110  DEEPFAKES: FALSE PORNOGRAPHY IS HERE [Vol. 17 
            AND THE LAW CANNOT PROTECT YOU 
 
is further elucidated by the fourth factor, the effect on the copyrighted 
work’s potential market or value, which is “undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use.”76 This factor’s analysis focuses on the 
causal connection between the infringement, the loss of revenue,77 and the 
potential market for the copyrighted work.78 The Victim still has the 
opportunity to use her specific Facebook photos for any commercial 
purpose, and its potential market value remains intact. Due to the nature 
of personal deepfakes, the Victim will be unable to distinguish which 
specific photograph is being used at a specific moment, complicating the 
issue of whether the Victim can succeed on a copyright infringement cause 
of action. 
 Despite deepfakes’ transformative nature, courts have never dealt 
with this type of medium, and there remains a chance that a judge can 
conclude that these publications sidestep the true intent of fair use—
promoting the arts. While § 107’s list of purposes is not exhaustive 
(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research), 
they give a general idea of activities regarded as fair use.79 Exploitation of 
another individual for lewd and sexual purposes may not fall into any of 
these categories. Regardless, the available remedies for victims of 
copyright infringement remain inadequate and insufficient. There is 
monetary relief: actual damages, disgorgement of the infringer’s profits, 
statutory damages,80 and attorney’s fees.81 But actual damages and 
statutory damages (up to $150,000 per work infringed)82 may not be 
plentiful since the Producer likely did not profit off the publication of the 
personal deepfake. Copyright infringement can lead to criminal 
punishment, too, but this is only when “the infringement was committed 
. . . for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”83 
Lastly, courts can grant an injunction,84 but an injunction will likely fail to 
                                                 
76 Id. at 566. 
77 See id. at 567 (“Similarly, once a copyright holder establishes with reasonable 
probability the existence of a causal connection between the infringement and a 
loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this 
damage would have occurred had there been no taking of copyrighted 
expression.”). 
78 Id. at 568. 
79 Id. at 560. 
80 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
81 Id. § 505. 
82 Id. § 504. 
83 Id. § 506. 
84 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
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erase personal deepfakes that have been broadly distributed around the 
internet. 
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In addition to any inadequate copyright infringement claims, the 
Victim may attempt to bring a bevy of tort claims. They too are subject to 
their own flaws and limitations. 
The Victim may pursue legal action by bringing a state tort claim 
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). State doctrines 
vary, but most require a showing that (1) the Producer intended to (2) 
cause the Victim severe emotional distress (3) by extreme and outrageous 
conduct and (4) the Victim suffered severe emotional distress as a result 
of the extreme and outrageous conduct.85 IIED cases require a deep factual 
analysis, and the Victim may only succeed in narrow circumstances where 
the Producer had the requisite intent and the Victim had suffered 
extremely.  
Almost all Victims of published personal deepfakes should be able 
to show the third element, that the publication of the deepfakes constitute 
extreme and outrageous conduct. Extreme and outrageous conduct does 
not extend to insults, threats, or annoyances.86 Instead, the conduct must 
be beyond the bounds of human decency, such that it would be regarded 
as intolerable in a civilized community.87 Here, the Victim could likely 
show that she, and reasonable members of the public will view the 
personal deepfake as outrageous. Assuming one even recognizes the 
fakery, the sheer realness of the video is likely to send a shiver down one’s 
spine and deliver a punch to one’s moral gut. It seems perfectly reasonable 
to imagine that a jury would find that personal deepfakes rise to the level 
of extreme and outrageous conduct when the Victim realizes that there is 
a published video of herself engaging in graphic, and even heinous, acts.  
The Victim must show that her distress is not only caused by the 
deepfake, but that the distress is severe enough to cause “mental suffering, 
mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like.”88 Under the fourth 
element, reactions of humiliation, embarrassment, anger, and/or horror 
must be extreme or “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected 
to endure it.”89 The Victim can feel distress from either watching it herself, 
or simply knowing it exists online or is being viewed by others. The 
                                                 
85 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
86 See id. cmt. d.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at cmt. j. 
89 Id. 
112  DEEPFAKES: FALSE PORNOGRAPHY IS HERE [Vol. 17 
            AND THE LAW CANNOT PROTECT YOU 
 
personal deepfake’s vileness and the number of viewers will likely affect 
the severity of the emotional distress and the strength of the IIED claim. 
Only a limited subset of Victims will succeed because of an inability to 
show that their mere embarrassment or even mortification rises to the level 
of emotional distress necessary to satisfy the second element. This group 
includes Victims of deepfakes that are not so graphic and Victims that are 
simply displeased but not extremely suffering. 
Victims will also have trouble showing the first element, the mens 
rea requirement. The Producer must “know[] that such distress is certain, 
or substantially certain, to result from his conduct” or that the reckless 
conduct was “in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that 
the emotional distress will follow.”90 The majority of the Producers who 
share a video online with friends or the general public will likely not know 
that any emotional distress is imminent because they do not expect that the 
Victim will watch the video or that the Victim will even learn of its 
existence. This high standard will prevent many Victims from succeeding 
on this cause of action when they stumble upon the video online or are 
made aware of the video by a third party. IIED claims, thus, appear to be 
limited to instances where the Producer intentionally sends the deepfake 
to the Victim or informs her of its circulation on the internet. The threat of 
IIED claims will not effectively diminish publications of deepfakes. 
The Victims of deepfakes will also have to deal with the Producer 
using the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause as a defense. Freedom 
of speech can act as a defense in state tort suits like IIED in the same way 
it can to defamation claims.91 The Court set aside a jury verdict imposing 
IIED tort liability on Westboro Baptist Church in Snyder v. Phelps,92 
where a deceased soldier’s father brought action against Westboro for 
picketing his son’s funeral.93 Whether the First Amendment protects this 
type of conduct depends on whether the speech is of public concern—in 
other words, whether it is deserving of substantially more protection than 
matters of private concern.94 The Court reiterated language from New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan about the Constitution’s commitment to maintaining 
debates on public issues to be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”95 
                                                 
90 Id. at cmt. i.  
91 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 450−51 (2011) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. 
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988)).  
92 Id. at 459. 
93 Id. at 447. 
94 See id. at 458 (“Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a matter 
of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First 
Amendment.”). 
95 Id. at 452 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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Matters of public concern relate to “any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community[.]”96 The Court opined that the circulation of 
videos of an employee engaging in sexual acts would be a private concern, 
since they “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the 
[employing agency’s] functioning or operation.”97 Similarly, personal 
deepfake Producers are not informing the community of anything of public 
concern—they are just fabricating a video of an individual doing a private 
act. The First Amendment recognizes the quintessential importance of the 
freedom to speak one’s mind as it relates to “the common quest for truth 
and the vitality of society as a whole[,]”98 but deepfakes are not a part of 
this journey. Finally, this affirmative defense can be weakened to the 
extent courts find deepfakes to be obscene, which lacks First Amendment 
protection.99 
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Recovery for a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(“NIED”) claim will largely rely on the state where the action is brought, 
that state’s applicable tort doctrine, and the factual context of the 
disseminated deepfake. Generally, these types of cases fall into two 
categories: (1) individuals who just escaped physical harm and 
consequently suffer emotional distress; and (2) bystanders who suffer 
emotional distress while witnessing another individual being harmed.100 
The first category of non-bystanders most closely resembles the context of 
published deepfakes, and the NIED doctrine within this category widely 
varies by state. Six states require a plaintiff to show that there was a 
physical impact as an effect of the negligent act,101 and over a dozen states 
require the plaintiff show that she was in the zone of danger during the 
negligent conduct.102  
However, a substantial amount of states allow recovery when the 
negligently inflicted emotional distress produced “some physical sign of 
                                                 
96 Id. at 453 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). 
97 Id. (citing San Diego v. Roe, 542 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)). 
98 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503−04 (1984)). 
99 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
100 John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 
90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 809−10 (2007). 
101 Id. at 810. The states are Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky and 
Nevada. Id. at 920 n.113.  
102 Id. at 815. The states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District 
of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. at 812 n.141. 
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its existence.”103 For example, Missouri allows a plaintiff to recover for 
NIED when “(1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct 
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the 
emotional distress or mental injury must be medically diagnosable and 
must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant.”104 
Missouri replaced the impact rule with this rule in Bass v. Nooney Co.,105 
when a woman suffered from anxiety after being trapped in an elevator 
twenty stories above ground-level.106 The issue with personal deepfake 
Victims is that they were never in a situation where actual physical harm 
from some tangible thing existed, like being trapped in an elevator.  
Eight states have even fewer limitations on recovery of damages 
for NIED for non-bystanders.107 For example, Tennessee approaches these 
cases under the general negligence doctrine—requiring a plaintiff to show 
that a defendant had a duty, breached that duty, and caused an injury or 
loss.108 And the emotional injury has to be so serious or severe that “a 
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately 
cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the 
case.”109 The Tennessee Supreme Court instituted this rule after a plaintiff 
viewed a dead body caused by a car accident.110  
These NIED cases highlight how many states require some 
physical incident that caused some real emotional harm—with or without 
accompanying physical symptoms. With personal deepfakes, the Victim 
never came close to being physically touched by something harmful or 
perceiving a traumatizing event that actually happened. Under current 
statues and precedent, it is unlikely that courts will begin to construe the 
NIED doctrine in a way that encapsulates fake videos that merely appear 
real. Even when personal deepfakes become so indistinguishable from 
videos of real events, Victims will generally know that they are not 
actually appearing in the videos and the portrayed act never occurred. 
                                                 
103 Id. at 812. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, and Utah. Id. at 920 n.123. 
104 Id. at 814 (citing Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772−73 (Mo. 1983) 
(en banc)). 
105 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).  
106 Id. at 813.  
107 Id. at 816 n.146. The states are Hawaii, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
108 Id. at 817 (citing Camper v. Minor 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996)). 
109 Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446. 
110 Id. at 439. 
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A rare individual may succeed with an NIED claim if the Producer 
owed a duty of care to the Victim. In Catsouras v. Department of 
California Highway Patrol,111 a California court found that a decedent’s 
family had a “cause of action for negligence, supporting emotional distress 
damages” when officers disseminated gruesome pictures of the decedent’s 
body via the Internet.112 The California Highway Patrol owed a duty of 
care to the family to not put these “images on the Internet for the lurid 
titillation of persons unrelated to official CHP business.”113 The court 
focused on three factors: foreseeability, moral blame, and the prevention 
of future harm.114 Therefore, in the context of personal deepfakes, it is 
possible for a Victim in California to have a cause of action against 
someone who uses photographs accessed by virtue of some relationship 
with the Victim that included a duty of care. While this fact pattern, too, 
can aim to satisfy one’s “lurid titillation,” the court may still hesitate to 
liken a personal deepfake to the repugnant photos in Catsouras. Personal 
deepfakes are still fake, and the respondents in Catouras had to relive real 
images of the teenage girl’s decapitated corpse. Most Victims of personal 
deepfakes will not have a claim of this rare caliber.115  
D. False Light 
 False Light tort claims, one of four distinct forms of invasion of 
the right of privacy,116 are the most applicable to deepfakes. Thirty-three 
                                                 
111 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal Ct. App. 2010). 
112 Id. at 358. 
113 Id. at 376. 
114 Id at 358. The court also considers other factors:  
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of 
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, 
. . . the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to 
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, 
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  
See id. at 372. 
115 This type of victim would not be able to recover in Arkansas and New Mexico 
as these two states continue to prohibit recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. See Kircher, supra note 100 at 809 n.110 (citing Mechs. 
Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ark. 1988); Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne 
Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 50 (N.M. 1997)). 
116 The three other forms are “Intrusion Upon Seclusion,” “Appropriation of Name 
or Likeness,” and “Publicity Given to Private Life.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 652B−D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). In the context of deepfakes, possible 
claims would involve the following examples: hacking one’s photos to create 
faceset (intrusion upon seclusion); using a deepfake in an advertisement 
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states’ common law doctrines allow for false light claims that generally 
have some common elements.117 An individual may be liable when 
“giv[ing] publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other 
before the public in a false light.” The portrayal must be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person, and the actor must have had knowledge or acted in 
reckless disregard in publicizing this person in a false light.118 Any 
revelation of matters that are of “legitimate concern to the public” are not 
invasions of privacy,119 and “publicity” refers to a communication made 
“to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be 
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”120  
  For example, the Ninth Circuit found a false light claim viable 
when a Playgirl magazine cover featured a shirtless Baywatch actor, Jose 
Salano, Jr., next to the headline, “TV Guys. PRIMETIME’S SEXY 
YOUNG STARS EXPOSED.”121 The court agreed that Salano had a 
triable issue of fact for the false light tort. The placement of the photograph 
and the text, the nude pictures of men inside the magazine, and the large 
bold letters screaming “12 Sizzling Centerfolds -- Ready to Score With 
You” insinuated that Solano was one of those individuals.122 Such analysis 
is applicable to personal deepfakes as they portray the Victim as being the 
person partaking in the sexual act. 
With personal deepfakes, the success of a false light claim also 
depends on the specific context of the deepfake and its publication as well 
as the state where the claim was brought. For instance, in California, “the 
information [must be] understood by one or more persons to whom it was 
disclosed as stating or implying something highly offensive that would 
have a tendency to injure Solano's reputation.”123 California’s standard of 
only requiring one individual to view the publication is much more victim-
friendly than the Restatement’s requirement of being viewed by the public 
                                                 
(appropriation of name or likeness); and taking peeping tom photos to be used in 
a deepfake (publicity given to private life).  
117 See 33 RICHARD E. KAYE, CAUSES OF ACTION 1 (2d ed. 2007).  
The states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. Id.  
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
119 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). 
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
121 Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002). 
122 See id. at 1082–83. 
123 Id. at 1082. 
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at large. Twenty states have followed the Restatement.124 Personal 
deepfake Victims in these states will likely have to wait until a substantial 
population of people watch the video to bring a false light cause of action. 
False light claims become murkier when the Producer has a 
warning or title that prefaces the video as fake or fictitious. Courts are 
likely to carefully balance the Producer’s First Amendment right to create 
fictitious works with the Victim’s privacy rights.125 The right of 
publicity126 does not exist when “a fictionalized account of an event in the 
life of a public figure is depicted in a novel or a movie.”127 The same 
limitation is likely applicable to private individuals. Victims of personal 
deepfakes will not be able to recover when that video discloses its 
fabrication to viewers. Today, many deepfakes found on pornographic 
websites have a few-second introductory title stating the username of the 
Producer that manufactured that video. This title is likely intended to give 
credit to the Producer rather than signify to the viewer that this is, indeed, 
fake pornography, but its consequence is as if the disclaimer stated it was 
fake. Disclaimers will likely diminish the strength of false light claims, but 
courts should still recognize the possibility that the viewer skipped the 
disclaimer or that the next distributor edited it out entirely. Victims may 
be left without any false light recourse if the disclaimer remains 
permanently on the video in a clear fashion. 
Similarly, the Victim of a low-quality personal deepfake—one 
that a reasonable person cannot believe to be true—will have difficulty 
recovering in this situation because its fakeness will be evident to viewers. 
In these personal deepfakes, the face may glitch by not following the head 
properly, be fixed into only one position, or not be properly rendered to 
look three-dimensional. However, it is likely this will become less of an 
issue as deepfake technology improves. 
                                                 
124 The states are Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. 33 CAUSES 
OF ACTION 2d 1, Cause of Action for False Light Invasion of Privacy (2007) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
125 See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(“Thus, the Court of Appeals in Spahn balanced the plaintiff's privacy rights 
against the first amendment protection of fictionalization Qua falsification and, 
after finding there to be no such protection, held for the plaintiff.”).  
126 “The ‘right of publicity’ gives famous people an assignable and descendible 
right in the commercial value of their names, likenesses, and other identifying 
characteristics.” Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular 
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 127 (1993). 
127 Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 433. 
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Remedies for false light invasion of privacy are similar to 
copyright infringement in that actual and punitive damages can help make 
the Victim whole but will not keep the video universally off the internet 
where it can continuously be distributed to others.128 If courts view 
deepfakes as protected speech under the First Amendment, there will 
likely be little room for compensatory damages. Moreover, intent and 
reputational harm plays a role in determining whether a false light claim 
overcomes constitutional protections of freedom of press. For example, 
the Second Circuit overturned a jury verdict for a false light claim because 
the plaintiff failed to show the requisite intent129 when the defendant 
misidentified the plaintiff as being the person in topless photos in a 
magazine.130 The Second Circuit was additionally concerned that “such an 
enormous verdict chills media First Amendment rights” and downplayed 
whether nude pictures “are even capable of producing genuine reputational 
harm.”131 Whether a personal deepfake causes great emotional distress or 
reputational harm will depend greatly on its quality (and perhaps whether 
there was a disclaimer) as well as its impact on the viewers.  
 Under the current legal framework, the majority of current and 
future Victims of personal deepfakes will fall through the legal cracks and 
be left without recourse. Victims who do not suffer from debilitating 
emotional distress cannot bring an IIED claim. Additionally, Victims who 
cannot show that the Producer intended to cause the emotional distress 
cannot bring an IIED claim. Mere distributors or further circulators of an 
already-produced personal deepfake will also not have the requisite intent. 
The success of an NIED cause of action will depend on the parties’ 
jurisdiction, but these claims will generally not be fruitful. Courts are 
hesitant to allow recovery for victims of incidents where the victims were 
not in jeopardy of that harm or did not watch someone be physically 
harmed. Moreover, false light invasion of privacy claims will not cover 
most Victims, unless the public at large becomes aware of the personal 
deepfake’s presence. Lastly, plaintiffs of false light claims may not be able 
to recover if there is a disclaimer that the deepfake is fake. A discussion 
of First Amendment rights will remain in the background for these claims, 
                                                 
128 Damages for this type of action include special damages, punitive damages, 
and actual damages from the harm to the Victim’s privacy interests and her mental 
and emotional distress. See 92 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 17 (updated 2018). 
129 Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 141 (2d Cir. 1984). 
130 Id. at 127. 
131 Id. at 141. The court presumed that because many celebrities have been 
portrayed nude, that these pictures are not as capable of causing a harm to one’s 
reputation. See id. 
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and the courts must decide how to balance free speech rights and the harm 
that personal deepfakes can cause. 
  Recovery for these torts will not make the Victim whole. Even if 
they are handsomely compensated, the video will remain on the internet 
perhaps indefinitely. Others can redistribute and republish the video 
online, making it nearly impossible for the Victim to continuously get 
webhosts to delete this content. The only way to deter this activity is to 
attach criminal liability to these publications. 
III. FUTURE LEGAL RECOURSE FOR PUBLISHED PERSONAL 
DEEPFAKES: NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY LAWS 
Fairly recent nonconsensual pornography statutes may be the most 
effective legal recourse against uploaders of personal deepfakes featuring 
nonconsenting individuals. Thirty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia have nonconsensual pornography laws.132 Under these statutes, 
                                                 
132 Alabama (Distributing a private image with intent to harass, threaten, coerce, 
or intimidate the person depicted, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-240) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2017)); Alaska (Harassment in the second degree, ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (a)(6) 
(2016)); Arizona (Unlawful disclosure of images depicting states of nudity or 
specific sexual activities, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1425) (Supp. 2017)); 
Arkansas (Unlawful distribution of sexual images or recordings, ARK. CODE. 
ANN. § 5-26-314) (Supp. 2017)); California (Disorderly conduct, CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 647) (West Supp. 2018)); Colorado (Posting a private image for 
harassment, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-107) (2018)); Connecticut (Unlawful 
dissemination of an intimate image, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c) (West Supp. 
2018)); Delaware (Violation of privacy, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335) (2017)); 
District of Columbia (Second degree unlawful publication, D.C. CODE § 22-3054) 
(2015)); Florida (Sexual cyber harassment, FLA. STAT. § 784.049) (West 2017)); 
Georgia (Prohibition on nude or sexually explicit electronic transmissions, GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-90) (2018); Hawaii (Violation of privacy in the first degree, 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1110.9) (LexisNexis 2018)); Idaho (Crime of video 
voyeurism, IDAHO CODE § 18-6609) (Supp. 2018)); Illinois (Non-consensual 
dissemination of private sexual images, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23) 
(West 2017)); Iowa (Harassment, IOWA CODE § 708.7) (West Supp. 2018)); 
Kansas (Breach of privacy, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101) (Supp. 2017)); Louisiana 
(Nonconsensual disclosure of a private image, LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283) (West 
2018)); Maine (Unauthorized dissemination of certain private images, ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511-A) (Supp. 2017)); Maryland (Revenge porn, MD. 
CODE, ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-809) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017)); Michigan 
(Dissemination of sexually explicit visual material, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 
750.145e) (West Supp. 2018); Minnesota (Nonconsensual dissemination of 
private sexual images, MINN. STAT. § 604.31) (West Supp. 2018)); Nevada 
(Unlawful dissemination of intimate image, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.780) 
(2015)); New Hampshire (Nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, 
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a Producer may be punished criminally, not solely civilly.133 Statutory 
language varies widely by jurisdiction with many states targeting “revenge 
porn”—cases where former sexual partners post sexually explicit photos 
or videos of a person online to cause distress or embarrassment.134 These 
laws feature certain phrases that are both applicable and inapplicable to 
personal deepfakes.  
North Carolina’s statute contains typical language that this section 
will analyze in the context of personal deepfakes.135  
(1) The person knowingly discloses an image of another person with 
the intent to do either of the following: a. Coerce, harass, intimidate, 
demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person. b. 
Cause others to coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or 
cause financial loss to the depicted person. (2) The depicted person 
is identifiable from the disclosed image itself or information offered 
in connection with the image. (3) The depicted person's intimate parts 
                                                 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9-a) (Supp. 2018)); New Jersey (Disclosure of 
images of sexual contact or undergarment-clad intimate parts of another person, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9) (West Supp. 2018)); New Mexico (Unauthorized 
distribution of sensitive images; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37A-1) (Supp. 2018)); 
North Carolina (Disclosure of private images, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A) 
(2017)); North Dakota (Distribution of intimate images without or against 
consent, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.2) (Supp. 2017)); Oklahoma 
(Nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 
1040.13b) (West Supp. 2018)); Oregon (Unlawful dissemination of an intimate 
image, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.472) (2017)); Pennsylvania (Unlawful 
dissemination of an intimate image, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131) (West 2015)); 
South Dakota (Use or dissemination of visual recording or photographic 
device without consent and with intent to self-gratify, harass, or embarrass, S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-4) (West 2017)); Tennessee (Unlawful exposure; image, 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-318) (2018)); Texas (Unlawful disclosure or 
promotion of intimate visual material, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16) (West 
Supp. 2017); Utah (Distribution of an intimate image, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-
203) (LexisNexis 2017)); Vermont (Disclosure of sexually explicit images 
without consent, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606) (Supp. 2017)); Virginia 
(Unlawful dissemination or sale of images of another VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
386.2) (2014)); Washington (Disclosing intimate images, WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.86.010) (West Supp. 2018)); West Virginia (Nonconsensual disclosure of 
private intimate images, W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018)); 
Wisconsin (Representations depicting nudity, WIS. STAT. § 942.09) (2018)). 
133 See id. 
134 See Revenge Porn, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/revenge_porn. (last visited Oct. 20, 
2018). 
135 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A. 
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are exposed or the depicted person is engaged in sexual conduct in 
the disclosed image. (4) The person discloses the image without the 
affirmative consent of the depicted person. (5) The person discloses 
the image under circumstances such that the person knew or should 
have known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.136 
A. Intent to Harm 
Twenty-four jurisdictions contain a culpability requirement that 
the individual must intend to cause harm to the other individual by 
disseminating the sexually explicit photograph or video.137 Including 
North Carolina, sixteen of the twenty-four states specifically include an 
intent to “harass”138 while others use similar language, such as intent to 
“intimidate,”139 cause “emotional distress,”140 and harm the person’s 
“health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or 
personal relationships[.]”141 Much like the IIED claims, these statutes will 
fail to protect the same majority of potential Victims of personal 
deepfakes. The Producers that share deepfakes amongst friends or post 
online without any harmful intent are not criminally liable.  
B. Expectation of Privacy 
 Statutes containing language about disseminating images under 
circumstances where the individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy create another roadblock for Producers to be criminally culpable. 
Thirteen states include such language.142 The Producer will argue that the 
plaintiff did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy to a fake 
video. The Victim or her sexual partner did not take the video of herself 
engaging in the sexual act because that act never occurred. Moreover, the 
images used in the faceset are widely accessible through social media sites, 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 See supra note 132, for details into the scope of these states’ statutes. The states 
are Alabama; Alaska; Colorado; District of Columbia; Florida; Hawaii; Iowa; 
Kansas; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Michigan; Nevada; New Mexico; North 
Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; Tennessee; Utah; 
Vermont; Virginia; and West Virginia. 
138 Id. The states are Alabama; Alaska; Colorado; Kansas; Louisiana; Maine; 
Nevada; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South 
Dakota; Vermont; Virginia; and West Virginia. 
139 Id., Iowa. 
140 Id., Maryland; Tennessee; Utah. 
141 Id., Hawaii.  
142 Id., Alabama; Arizona; Connecticut; Delaware; Idaho; Kansas; Minnesota; 
North Carolina; North Dakota; South Dakota; Utah; Vermont; Washington; and 
Wisconsin. 
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and the nude private parts are taken from already published porn clips, 
likely featuring porn stars who willingly revealed their body. A strong 
argument for Victims would be likening the privacy interests in these fake 
videos to the privacy interests in false light tort claims—the Victims’ right 
to not be publicized in a false light.143 The Victim can also argue the 
deepfake is so life-like that it is as if the video represented a real, private 
event. Courts’ interpretation of “privacy” as to whether the video had to 
be fully real is similar to the task of interpreting whether “intimate” body 
parts have to actually be the Victim’s. 
C. Intimate Areas and Sexual Acts 
  Sixteen states use the phrase “intimate parts” or “intimate 
areas”144 which are typically defined in statutes as the unclothed genital 
areas.145 Some states also use “engaged in a sexual act,”146 and “state of 
nudity.”147 Given that personal deepfakes often superimpose a Victim’s 
head on the body of another, the central question is: can these terms apply 
to a Victim whose actual body parts are not visible? Or, can “intimate body 
parts” refer to areas that are not the Victim’s?  
The answer to this question may lie in the usage of “depiction.” 
Like North Carolina, thirty-one states148 use the term “depicted person’s 
intimate parts.”149 However, depiction is not usually defined in these 
statutes. In Pennsylvania, “visual depiction” is defined as “[a] 
representation by picture, including, but not limited to, a photograph, 
                                                 
143 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
144 Id., California; Colorado; Idaho; Louisiana; Maryland; Minnesota; Nevada; 
New Jersey; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon; Tennessee; Texas; Washington; 
and West Virginia.  
145 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 647 (“‘[I]ntimate body part’ means any portion of 
the genitals, the anus and in the case of a female, also includes any portion of the 
breasts below the top of the areola, that is either uncovered or clearly visible 
through clothing.”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-23.5 (“’Intimate parts’ means the 
fully unclothed, partially unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area, 
anus, or if the person is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple, including 
exposure through transparent clothing.”). 
146 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (a)(6)); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-23.5.  
147 See supra note 132. These states are Arkansas; Arizona; Maine; and 
Pennsylvania. 
148 Id. These states are Alabama; Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; 
Delaware; District of Columbia; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Louisiana; 
Maine; Minnesota; Nevada; New Mexico; North Carolina; North Dakota; 
Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; 
Vermont; Virginia; West Virginia; Wisconsin; and Washington. 
149 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.5A. 
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videotape, film or computer image.”150 This follows the ordinary meaning 
of “depiction.” Oxford English Dictionary’s definition includes “graphic 
representation”151 and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
defines “depiction” as “representation” and “portrayal.”152 
“Representation” is further defined as “a likeness, picture, model, or other 
reproduction.”153 These definitions clarify that “depiction” can apply to 
more than a real-life, true to form representation of a given thing (in this 
case a person). The term can apply to instances where a person is portrayed 
in video-form through a combined representation of that individual’s face 
and another person’s body. Since faces are generally used to differentiate 
between people, there can be a depiction of the Victim when their face is 
clearly shown and the body is represented to be that person’s. North 
Carolina’s involuntary porn statute also allows this reasoning by defining 
“image” as “any visual depiction . . . or computer-generated image.”154 
North Dakota and Utah have similar language.155 Victims’ hope for a 
victory in criminal court thus depends on the Producers’ intent and judges’ 
interpretations of key phrases like “privacy,” “intimate areas,” and 
“depiction.” 
D. The Need for a Federal Criminal Statute 
  Deepfakes will become so life-like that they will be 
indistinguishable from actual videos. This is an inevitable consequence of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. The law should 
be equipped to handle this impending problem. Currently, courts may be 
hesitant to agree that the Victim becomes the nude person in the deepfake 
for purposes of non-consensual pornography statutes. State legislatures 
likely did not intend to criminalize personal deepfakes as they did not exist 
when the laws were introduced. The requisite intent to harm illustrates that 
they were trying to deter harassing and retaliatory conduct, more so than a 
sharing of a video for pure self-gratification.156 As shown in the previous 
section,157 tort law is unlikely to deter future Producers of this type of 
content since only limited groups of Victims will be able to seek and 
recover damages. Shifting this litigation from a plaintiff in a civil context, 
who has to incur the accompanying legal costs, to the criminal context 
                                                 
150 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131. 
151 Depiction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
152 Depiction, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). 
153 Representation, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). 
154 § 14-190.5A. 
155 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.2 (Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5b-203 (LexisNexis 2017). 
156 Of course, personal deepfakes can be used in a retaliatory manner as well.  
157 See supra Part II. 
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where a prosecutor takes the reigns in representing the state or 
government, is the best avenue for recourse. Additionally, a federally-
administered legal scheme would remove any ambiguities in the statutory 
language and ensure uniformity, which is important as internet content can 
surely cross state lines.158   
 An ideal federal statute would prohibit the online publication of 
deepfakes and would not require an intent to harm. Publishing personal 
deepfakes online is akin to an online publication of a sex tape without the 
involved person’s consent. The inability to permanently delete content 
from the internet creates enough mental, emotional, and physical harm to 
warrant prohibition. Sending a personal deepfake via email to a friend 
should be considered an online publication because of the likelihood that 
the video will linger on the internet forever. Current laws against 
distributing private images online, too, should not require an “intentional” 
level of mens rea since these victims suffer from similar issues as personal 
deepfake victims. Therefore, this statute should also punish online 
circulators of these personal deepfakes, including those who did not even 
produce the video. The statute should use the word “depiction” and include 
computer-generated images within its definition. This federal non-
consensual pornography statute, thus, would encapsulate both real private 
videos and deepfakes. Lastly, the statute should also permit a civil action 
to be brought against a Producer who violates that statute. Florida 
approaches revenge porn statutes this way by allowing an individual to 
bring a separate civil cause of action to incur injunctive relief and actual 
damages.159  
Even in the criminal context, this statute would be limited by First 
Amendment protections, such as when the image is “related to a matter of 
public interest, public concern, or related to a public figure who is 
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions, or by 
reasons of his fame shapes events in areas of concern to society.”160 These 
limitations are unlikely to apply to most personal deepfakes, but they may 
be implicated if this statute covers public figures whose images are 
published online without their consent. The legality of mere production of 
personal deepfakes is a separate issue. 
                                                 
158 Congress has constitutional power to pass laws dealing with internet content 
under the Commerce Clause. See e.g., United States v. Giboney, 863 F.3d 1022, 
1026 (8th Cir. 2017) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 527 (2017) (“The [i]nternet is an 
instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
159 FLA. STAT. § 784.049 (West 2017). 
160 La. Stat. ANN. § 14:283 (West 2018). 
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IV. LEGALITY OF PRODUCING BUT NOT PUBLISHING  
PERSONAL DEEPFAKES 
The creation of personal deepfakes at home does not carry the 
same harms that accompany published ones. The Victim does not have the 
chance to be traumatized by the otherworldly, out-of-body experience of 
watching herself perform something that never happened or knowing that 
others are also watching. Friends, family, and colleagues do not get to 
wrestle with watching a video that they may believe is real. Personal 
deepfakes are lewd and even despicable, but is this enough? Moral 
disapproval does not necessitate illegality. 
 Courts are most likely to analyze the legality of producing 
deepfakes at home under obscenity doctrine and the Miller test. The 
Supreme Court found that child pornography is not afforded First 
Amendment protection even when not obscene under Miller.161 In New 
York v. Ferber,162 the Court found a compelling state interest in 
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor”163 
when upholding the New York statute prohibiting the promotion of child 
pornography.164 It is inconsequential whether there is any literary, artistic, 
political, scientific, or social value when there is the sexual exploitation of 
the child.165  
Congress has attempted to prohibit further forms of child 
pornography by passing the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA),166 
which included  a prohibition on “any visual depiction, including any 
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated 
image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.”167 This prohibition included “virtual child 
pornography,” which can be created by either using adults looking like 
minors or with the assistance of computer generated images.168 The 
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition found the federal 
statute went beyond Ferber since no actual children were being 
                                                 
161 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982). 
162 458 U.S. 747 (1982).  
163 Id. at 756 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 
(1982)). 
164 Id. at 774. 
165 Id. at 761. 
166 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-209, § 2251, 110 
Stat 3009 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251).  
167 Id. § 2256. 
168 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002). 
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exploited.169 Thus, the federal statute had to be analyzed under Miller,170 
and it was still overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.171 As 
mentioned earlier, the Court acknowledged that pedophiles could use these 
virtual videos to help encourage children to engage in sexual activity172 
but that not all teenage sexual activity “appeal[s] to the prurient 
interest.”173 Moreover, both “teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse 
of children . . . have inspired countless literary works.”174 Courts cannot 
ban a product only because of its potential to be used for immoral 
purposes.175  
After Free Speech Coalition, Congress changed § 2256(8)’s 
definition to “digital image, computer image, or computer-generated 
image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”176 This updated statute has not been legally 
challenged yet, and the issue becomes increasingly complex as virtual 
images become more lifelike,177 especially with the emergence of personal 
deepfakes. In 2003, Congress also passed the PROTECT Act, which 
prohibits the “making [of] a visual depiction that is a digital image, 
computer image, or computer-generated image of, or that is 
indistinguishable from an image of, a minor engaging in specified sexually 
explicit conduct.”178 Under this Act a man was convicted in 2008 for 
receiving online anime cartoons depicting minors engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.179 The Fourth Circuit found that this material was 
obscene under Miller and upheld the conviction.180 The Supreme Court 
declined to hear the case.181  
                                                 
169 Id. at 240. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 256. 
172 Id. at 241. 
173 Id. at 246. 
174 Id. at 247−48. 
175 See id. at 251 (“There are many things innocent in themselves, however, such 
as cartoons, video games, and candy, that might be used for immoral purposes, 
yet we would not expect those to be prohibited because they can be misused.”).  
176 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2016). 
177 Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal 
Enactments Proscribing Obscenity and Child Pornography or Access Thereto on 
the Internet, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2005). 
178 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2252). 
179 See United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
558 U.S. 1117 (2010).  
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
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These cases help elucidate how to approach personal deepfakes 
and the Miller test. A statute banning all deepfakes depicting pornography 
will likely be unconstitutionally overbroad, and prohibitions on deepfakes 
involving children are constitutional when they are obscene. Courts will 
likely find that some deepfake pornographies have some societal value. 
Pornographic deepfakes can be artistic and not entirely graphic or lewd. 
Additionally, the court’s analysis in Free Speech Coalition highlights the 
legal importance of an individual being physically harmed, something not 
present in personal deepfakes.182  
While the publication of personal deepfakes may and should be 
illegal, their creation could remain legal. Killing with the use of a hammer 
is illegal, but hammers themselves are not illegal. In the same manner, we 
are not obligated to ban the device (the computer and the software used) 
that helps create personal deepfakes. The Court believes that “education 
and punishment for violations of the law” are to be deterrents.183 
Prohibitions on creating personal deepfakes are unnecessary when 
criminal prohibitions on the publications are believed to be deterrents.  
Furthermore, in Stanley v. Georgia,184 the Supreme Court ruled 
that “the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally 
be made a crime.”185 While there is a right to receive ideas and information 
of any social value, we have a “right to be free . . . from unwanted 
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy” and “the right to be let 
alone.”186 The Court reasoned that the government is not in the business 
of telling its citizens what books they can read or movies they can watch.187 
The Constitution prevents the government from controlling one’s mind.188  
                                                 
182 See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 262 (2002). 
183 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566–67 (1969) (“But more important, if 
the State is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing antisocial 
conduct, we believe that in the context of private consumption of ideas and 
information we should adhere to the view that ‘among free men, the deterrents 
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for 
violations of the law[.] . . . Given the present state of knowledge, the State may 
no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may 
lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on 
the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.”). 
184 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
185 Id. at 559. 
186 Id. at 564. 
187 Id. at 565. 
188 Id.  
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  The Court, too, doubted its ability to draw the line between mere 
entertainment and the transmission of ideas.189 A pornography is a unique 
production that is arguably entertainment but likely does not add to the 
marketplace of ideas or help parse out false information.190 Personal 
deepfakes are both entertainment and false information. Nonetheless, the 
Court’s emphasis on the sacrosanctity of what happens in the privacy of 
one’s home will likely protect the creation of deepfakes. This is the correct 
application of the law. A person has a right to not be portrayed online in a 
false light. However, individuals do not have a right to prevent others from 
tampering with images in the privacy of their own homes and for personal 
use. While not everyone consents to their photograph being used in 
Photoshop or being cut out and placed on top of another body in a collage, 
these very acts are nevertheless legal. Illegal harms are embedded in the 
deepfakes that society will see.  
CONCLUSION 
Life-like personal deepfakes are here, and the law does not 
currently protect individuals who have not consented or participated in the 
production and publication of false pornography. Tort doctrines and 
revenge porn statutes were not intended to tackle the consequences of a 
technology that transforms a person’s sexual fantasy into reality. There 
will soon be pressure on courts bend statutes to protect victims of personal 
deepfakes and on legislatures to take the necessary steps to prohibit future 
publications. There ought to be a federal prohibition on the online 
publication or dissemination of any personal deepfake. While we wait for 
these legal mechanisms to potentially fall into place, the technology is only 
going to improve. It takes hours to make a deepfake. Soon, it will take 
seconds, and the product will be indistinguishable from real videos. We 





                                                 
189 Id. at 566. 
190 See discussion supra Part I. 
